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Introduction
Much of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy proclaimed the end 
the metaphysics and the death of God. The German, French, and English 
strands of the Enlightenment were united in their suspicion of metaphysi-
cal theism. Figures as diverse as Comte, Marx, Spencer, Nietzsche, and 
Russell defended the absolute autonomy of atheist reason against religious 
faith. Following the rise of partisan ideologies that terrorized the West 
from 1789 to 1989, the downfall of the Soviet empire appeared to her-
ald the “end of history” and a global convergence toward liberal market 
democracy. Ideas of freedom and justice would henceforth be confined 
to the immanent space of secular politics and stripped of all references to 
the transcendent, supernatural Good.1 Thus, the advent of post-ideological 
politics seemed to be broadly in line with the anti-metaphysical outlook of 
postmodern philosophy.
But as we now know, the end of history never began. 1989 was not so 
much the victory of democratic capitalism over totalitarian communism as 
the uprising of civil society and the Church against authoritarian regimes 
and state-orchestrated atheism.2 In the West and elsewhere, the 1990s 
witnessed the triumph of neo-liberal ideology masquerading as pragmatic 
1. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (1989): 3–18; 
John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 14, no. 3 (1985): 223–51.
2. Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Allen 
Lane, 1994); Maurice Glasman, Unnecessary Suffering: Managing Market Utopia (Lon-
don: Verso, 1996), pp. 86–97.
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centrism—a “third way” beyond left and right, to which there was seem-
ingly no alternative.3 9/11 marked the displacement of secular terror by 
religious terror and the clash of fanatical faiths that are secretly collusive.4 
Crucially, the return of religion in international relations has coincided 
not just with the “theological turn” of both French phenomenology and 
“Anglo-Saxon” philosophy.5 Of equal, if not greater, importance is the 
revival of metaphysics and virtue ethics across the continental/analytic 
divide.6 So what we are seeing is not the contours of politics and ethics 
beyond metaphysics but rather the revival of metaphysical ideas that are 
variously more theological or more secular.
Why the resurgence of metaphysics? Is not metaphysics wedded to 
a foundationalist conception of being and to transhistorical, objectively 
fixed notions of truth or meaning that provide the transcendent grounding 
of modern political thought? Does not the demise of modernity finally 
liberate subjectivity from the illusion of a life invested with sacred sig-
nificance and governed by supernaturally determined ethical imperatives? 
Instead of equating the modern with the metaphysical, this essay contends 
that it was the late medieval exit from metaphysics that brought about 
the modern “political ontology” that is now in crisis. As such, postmod-
ern philosophers from Nietzsche to Heidegger and from Jacques Derrida 
to Jean-Luc Marion are wrong to dismiss the whole Western tradition of 
metaphysics since Plato as onto-theological. The metaphysical politics 
that the essay seeks to retrieve overcomes the modern logic of dualism and 
3. Anthony Giddens, Beyond Left and Right (Cambridge: Polity, 1994); Anthony 
Giddens, The Third Way (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
4. Adrian Pabst, “Unholy War and Just Peace: Religious Alternatives to Secular War-
fare,” Politics and Religion, 3, no. 2 (2009): 209–32.
5. Dominique Janicaud, Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française 
(Paris: Ed. de l’Eclat, 1991); Craig Paterson and Matthew S. Pugh, eds., Analytical 
Thomism: Traditions in dialogue (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
6. Emmanuel Lévinas, Autrement qu’être ou Au-delà de l’essence (Paris: Le Livre 
de Poche, 1974); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985); 
Alain Badiou, L’être et l’événement (Paris: Seuil, 1988); Alain Badiou, Abrégé de méta-
politique (Paris: Seuil, 1998); Alain Badiou, Logiques des mondes: L’être et l’événement 2 
(Paris: Seuil, 2006); Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Extinction and Enlightenment (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Cf. John Milbank, “Only Theology Saves Metaphysics,” in 
Peter M. Candler Jr. and Conor Cunningham, eds., Belief and Metaphysics (London: SCM, 
2007), pp. 452–500; John Milbank, “The Return of Metaphysics in the 21st Century,” in 
Philosophy: A Theological Critique (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), ch. 1.
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the postmodern dialectics of difference in the direction of the non-modern 
logic of paradox that offers the possibility of an alternative modernity.
The first part shows how modern “political ontology” originates with 
the late medieval reconception of metaphysics as onto-theology. Duns 
Scotus’s transcendental science of onto-theology is correlated with Ock-
ham’s nominalist-voluntarist account of power and Machiavelli’s secular 
science of politics. The second part suggests that liberalism combines 
transcendentalism with positivism and underpins the politics of left versus 
right, which has been dominant since the secular settlement of the French 
Revolution. The third part contrasts the dualism of modern “political 
ontology” with the paradox of metaphysical politics.
I. Modern Political Ontology in Question
Broadly speaking, modernity has been equated with variants of metaphys-
ics—including Descartes’ first philosophy, Kant’s transcendental idealism, 
and Hegel’s panlogism. Similarly, postmodernity is associated with the 
attempt to overcome the metaphysical in one of two directions: either 
various phenomenological accounts of pure appearing outside being or 
else analytic philosophies of language and logic prior to being. Parallel 
considerations apply to politics and ethics. For the moderns, the represen-
tation of subjects as formal bearers of equal yet abstract, individual rights 
warranted a shift in sovereignty from the autonomy of corporate groups 
or associations to the collective power of the city (Descartes), the state 
(Hegel), or the liberal cosmospolis (Kant) over the individual.7 Against 
modern dualism that collapses back into monism, the postmodern celebra-
tion of difference promised the sort of emancipation that the Renaissance 
and the Enlightenment purported to provide but failed to deliver.
But if, as the French philosopher of science Bruno Latour has argued, 
“we have never been modern” because there was never any absolute, 
irreversible break in history that gave rise to a coherent system of ideas 
and institutions that we commonly call “modernity,”8 perhaps it is then 
also the case that we have been never been postmodern because postmo-
dernity retrieves and extends certain modern ideas. Philosophically and 
politically, those ideas can be traced to the late medieval shift from the 
7. Adrian Pabst, “Modern Sovereignty in Question: Theology, Democracy and Capi-
talism,” Modern Theology 26, no. 4 (2010): 570–602.
8. Bruno Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes: essai d’anthropologie symé-
trique (Paris: La Découverte, 1991).
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metaphysics of participation and the analogy of being to the ontology (or 
later epistemology) of representation and the univocity of being.9 I shall 
return to the nature and importance of this shift presently.
For now, a brief point needs to be made about the postmodern appeal to 
univocal being and the immanent. Whether the quasi-metaphysical Marx-
ism of Gilles Deleuze or the apparently pluralist liberalism of John Rawls, 
both these thinkers invoke in different ways the reign of immanence to 
defend a kind of political pluralism that is variously more revolutionary 
or more conformist.10 Likewise, the late medieval collapse of divine being 
and created being into a single, univocal singularity of being that is tran-
scendentally prior even all actual finite beings becomes the ontological 
event of the virtual in Deleuze and Badiou. Beyond both actuality and 
possibility, the virtual either enfolds the difference of the many within 
the univocal being of the one (Deleuze) or else the irreducible infinity of 
the multiple that nevertheless manifest the universal (Badiou).11 Catherine 
Pickstock’s characterization of our contemporary condition as “post-
modern scholasticism” and as a certain “modern Middle Age” is surely 
correct.12 So if “postmodernity” is in the end a radicalization of certain 
modern developments rather than a new phase of history, then it is also 
the case that the modern coincides with the onto-theological science of 
transcendental ontology and not after all with metaphysics.
To understand the significance of this difference for political philoso-
phy, a revisionist genealogy is needed. Pace Heidegger and Derrida, it is 
wrong to claim that the whole of Western metaphysics since Plato has been 
onto-theological and logocentric. Nor is it correct to suggest that Kant’s 
critical turn liberated philosophy from theistic metaphysics and secured 
9. Olivier Boulnois, Être et représentation. Une généalogie de la métaphysique 
moderne à l’époque de duns Scot (xIIIe-xIVe siècle) (Paris: P.U.F., 1999). Cf. Catherine 
Pickstock, “Modernity and Scholasticism: A Critique of Recent Invocations of Univoc-
ity,” Antonianum 78 (2003): 3–46; Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation of hierarchy 
(Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 2012), pp. 272–382.
10. Gilles Deleuze, différence et répétition (Paris: P.U.F., 1968); Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari, Capitalisme et schizophrénie 1: L’anti-Œdipe (Paris: Minuit, 1972) and 
Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2: mille plateaux (Paris: Minuit, 1980); John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia UP, 1993).
11. In addition to Alain Badiou’s duology L’être et l’événement, see his Court traité 
d’ontologie transitoire (Paris: Seuil, 1988).
12. Catherine Pickstock, “Postmodern Scholasticism: Critique of Postmodern Uni-
vocity,” Telos 126 (2003): 3–24.
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the autonomy of the subject. Much rather, the late medieval shift from 
metaphysical participation and analogical being to ontological-epistemo-
logical representation and univocal being introduced a series of concepts 
that remain central to modern and postmodern politics. In what follows, 
the focus will be on three related notions: the primacy of the possible over 
the actual (possibilism); univocal being and the autonomy of philosophy 
from theology (transcendentalism); absolute power and the autonomy of 
politics from metaphysics (absolutism).
First of all, beginning with Avicenna and influential Latin theologians 
such as Gilbert Porreta in the eleventh century, the notion of being (ens) 
gradually changed from that which is by participating in the transcen-
dent source of being itself to a transcendental category that includes all 
beings, divine or created.13 Being so configured is transcendentally prior 
to actuality and coextensive with all the conditions of possibility for the 
instantiation of finite beings by the infinite cause of being. For Avicenna as 
for John Duns Scotus, the necessity of the possible takes precedence over 
the contingency of the actual. William of Ockham’s work radicalizes the 
primacy of the possible over the actual by claiming that possibility pre-
cedes both actuality and intelligibility. As such, the contingent no longer 
reveals its origin in the pure act of God but is instead grounded in the tran-
scendental realm of the possible that is beyond the logical and the actual. 
Ockham writes that “possible being is something a creature has of itself 
[. . . and] a creature is possible, not because anything pertains to it, but 
because it can exist in reality.”14 Coupled with his nominalism (denying 
the real presence of universals in things), Ockham’s ontology drains actu-
ally existing beings of any relation to their divine source: “divine actuality 
disappears behind the infinite variety of what is possible.”15 Thus, actual 
being loses ontological integrity and reflects nothing but the potentia 
absoluta of divine volition, which is central to his account of political 
power. By elevating the possible over the actual, Scotus and Ockham inau-
gurated modern modal metaphysics: “until the early fourteenth century 
13. Eric Alliez, Les temps capitaux, vol. 1, Récits de la conquête du temps (Paris: 
Cerf, 1991), pp. 269–322.
14. William of Ockham, I Sent., d. 43, q. 2, in Opera Philosophica et Theologica, 
ed. G. I. Etzekorn and F. E. Kelley (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure UP, 1979), 
4:640–50.
15. Harry R. Klocker, William of Ockham and the divine freedom (Milwaukee: Mar-
quette UP, 1992), p. 114.
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possibilities were treated as having a foundation in God; in the modern 
theory they were dissociated from this ontological backing.”16
Second, Scotus’s ontology marks a decisive break with the Thomist 
metaphysics of participation and analogical being. As a transcendental 
category that encompasses both finite and infinite being, ens is no longer 
distributed analogically among finite beings but instead applies univocally 
to both God and creation.17 Thus Scotus rejected (what was later accurately 
termed) Aquinas’s analogia entis in favor of univocal being. If ens is uni-
vocal, then it represents at once the most general and the highest form of 
being. That is why Olivier Boulnois is right to argue that the conception 
of metaphysics as onto-theology begins with Scotus, not with Aristotle or 
Aquinas.18 By redefining the object as univocal being, the onto-theological 
turn of metaphysics brackets the question of God and inverts the medi-
eval pre-eminence of theology over philosophy, which was common to 
Plato and Aristotle. In this manner, onto-theology foreshadows the secular 
autonomy of reason from faith.
Like the other shifts discussed in this section, the emergence of tran-
scendentalism is complex and would require a longer exposition that is 
beyond the scope of this essay. However, we know that it was Francisco 
Suárez who in the late sixteenth century posited the priority of metaphysics 
as the science of general being over theology as the science of revelation. 
Linked to this is his separation of “pure nature” from the supernatural 
and other dualistic oppositions such as faith versus reason or the body 
politic versus the corpus mysticum of the Church.19 Following Scotus and 
Suárez, the German thinker Johannes Clauberg or Clauvergius (1622–65) 
16. Lilli Alanen and Simo Knuuttila, “The Foundations of Modality and Conceiv-
ability in Descartes and His Predecessors,” in Simo Knuuttila, ed., Modern Modalities: 
Studies of the history of Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), pp. 1–69; here, p. 41.
17. Ludwig Honnefelder, Ens inquantum ens: der Begriff des Seiendes als solchen 
als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes duns Scotus (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 1979); Ludwig Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens: die formale Bestim-
mung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (duns 
Scot, Suarez, Kant, Pierce) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990).
18. Olivier Boulnois, “Analogie et univocité selon Duns Scot: la double destruction,” 
Les Études Philosophiques 3 (1989): 347–69; Olivier Boulnois, “Quand commence l’onto-
théologie? Aristote, Thomas d’Aquin et Duns Scot,” Revue Thomiste 95 (1995): 85–108.
19. John Montag S.J., “Revelation: The False Legacy of Suárez,” in John Milbank et 
al., eds., Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 38–63. Cf. 
Pabst, Metaphysics, pp. 308–40.
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replaced the term “metaphysics” with “ontosophia” or “ontology” in order 
to describe the science of being qua being (ens inquantum ens).20 Through 
the work of Christian Wolff, Kant inherits the twin strands of transcen-
dentalism and possibilism that underpin his focus on the conditions of 
possibility. Even if the term metaphysics does not fall into desuetude, it is 
nevertheless the case that its meaning has already shifted from participation 
in the transcendent being of God to the representation of transcendental 
being itself.
Third, ontological transcendentalism is correlated with political abso-
lutism. Here the crucial nexus is between Ockham’s nominalist-voluntarist 
theology and Machiavelli’s new science of politics. According to nominal-
ist ontology, universals only exist in the mind and are not present in things, 
which separates the transcendent source of being from the immanent world. 
Paradoxically, that move was anticipated by Scotus’s univocal collapse 
of divine and created being into transcendental ens and the concomitant 
bracketing of God from ontology. The voluntarist subordination of God’s 
intellect to the power of volition privileges divine intervention in the world 
based on potentia dei absoluta at the expense of grace and wisdom. The 
combined effect of Ockham’s nominalist and voluntarist theology is to 
elevate the singular over the universal and to sunder the earthly dominium 
from the heavenly city of God. This autonomy foreshadows Suárez’s later 
separation of nature from the supernatural and provides the foundation for 
state supremacy vis-à-vis the Church and all other institutions within the 
temporal-spatial realm of the saeculum. As Janet Coleman suggests, the 
consequence of separating politics from theology is that
secular politics not only has its own process of self-correction, but that 
it is independent of ecclesial power . . . . Because the temporal sphere is 
imperfect, he [Ockham] argued that secular sovereignty, once estab-
lished, could be legitimate even when ‘absolute’, in that there need not 
be regular participation of the people in government, nor need there be 
institutions to restrain the power of kings.21
20. Johannes Clauberg, Elementa philosophiae sive ontosophiae (Groningen: Joan-
nis Nicolai, 1647). See Etienne Gilson, L’être et l’essence, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1972), 
pp. 144–86; Jean-François Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique (Paris: P.U.F., 
1990), pp. 246–92, 436–57.
21. Janet Coleman, “Ockham’s Right Reason and the Genesis of the Political as 
‘Absolutist,’” history of Political Thought 20 (1999): 35–64; here, pp. 48, 50.
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Thus, Ockham’s account of unconstricted secular sovereignty foregrounds 
the doctrine of the divine right of kings that underpins modern political 
absolutism.22
Machiavelli fuses the late medieval nominalist-voluntarist account of 
autonomous secular authority with a neo-pagan conception of power as 
virtù (or heroic agonism). He radicalizes the early modern redefinition of 
dominium as power, private property, individual rights, and absolute sov-
ereignty23 by divorcing the exercise of legitimate authority from notions 
of moral goodness. In this way, his account inverts the primacy of the 
good over evil (defined by St. Augustine as privatio boni) and defends a 
political anthropology that is predicated on violent conflict. This inversion 
goes back to Ockham’s nominalist erasure of universal goodness from 
particular beings and anticipates the idea of a violent state of nature in the 
modern tradition of the social contract from Hobbes to Kant. Contrary to 
the metaphysics of participation that views the civitas terrena as ordered 
toward the hierarchical ends of the civitas dei in which it partakes, tran-
scendental “political ontology” equates the kingdom and city-republic 
with a competition for survival and power.
In The Prince (especially chapter IX), it is the use of fear and force 
that ultimately regulates political and civic life, not the pursuit of peace or 
virtuous practice.24 Connected with this is the appeal to myth of fortuna, 
an imagined existential threat to the political order that demands a violent 
response—based on redefining virtue in terms of the neo-pagan heroism 
that invests the leader with a secular sacrality.25 Here it is instructive to con-
sider Suárez who opposes the divine right of kings in the name of popular 
sovereignty but radicalizes Ockham’s argument that the unilateral transfer 
of power from the people to the monarch is necessarily irrevocable. In 
contrast to Aquinas’s distinction between the church as corpus mysticum 
and the state as “body politic,” Suárez’s conception of the population as a 
22. John Neville Figgis, The Theory of the divine Right of Kings (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge UP, 1896).
23. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), pp. 7–25.
24. Pierre Manent, histoire intellectuelle du libéralisme: dix leçons (Paris: Calmann-
Lévy, 1987), pp. 31–50; J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: florentine Political 
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, rev. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 
2003), pp. 156–82.
25. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, ch. 25, in The Chief Works and Others, trans. 
Allan Gilbert (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1965), vol. 1, esp. pp. 90–92.
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“single mystical body” replaces the patristic and medieval primacy of the 
ecclesial community over the state with the early modern supremacy of 
the state over the people. Just as Scotus and Ockham secularize the politi-
cal order, so Machiavelli and Suárez sacralize state power.
Divine will and potentia dei absoluta are in some sense reflected 
in the monarch’s will-to-power. Arguably, one can speak of political 
absolutism because power is now neither seen as a gift of divine grace 
that requires righteous rule nor constrained by substantive transcendent 
telos—whether an impersonal cosmic force such as Plato’s Good and Aris-
totle’s Prime Mover or the personal Creator God of the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. Machiavelli’s purported realism turns out to be an extension of 
Ockham’s nominalism and voluntarism that builds on Scotus’s ontology 
of representation.
Taken together, the triple currents of possibilism, transcendentalism, 
and absolutism flow from Avicenna, Scotus, and Ockham through Machia-
velli through Suárez to Hobbes, Locke, and Kant. The collective dimension 
of sovereign authority is reduced to an individualist mode of power, while 
at the same time the citizens and corporate groups that compose the com-
mon polity are subsumed under a collectivity whose continued assent is no 
longer required. Popular sovereignty is entirely compatible with the abso-
lute, executive power of the sovereign. Authoritarian democracy—whether 
in its republican (Machiavelli) or its monarchical guise (Suárez)—is not 
so much a contradiction or an oxymoron as a paradox that links modern 
absolutism to modern liberalism.26 Here one can already see the dialectic 
between the “one” and the “many” that is coextensive with the nominal-
ist poles of left versus right, which govern both modern and postmodern 
politics—as the following section argues.
II. Liberalism and the (Post-)Modern Politics of Left versus Right
Philosophically and politically, there are three fundamental continuities 
from the late Middle Ages through modernity to our late (or post-)modern 
era. First of all, a twin accentuation on “the rule of the one” and “the rule of 
the many.” The former is the sovereign center that is either more autocratic 
or more plutocratic—or indeed both. The latter is the sovereign people 
who are either in contracted dispersion or in collective unity. The “one” 
and “the many” are dialectically related and collude at the expense of the 
26. Cf. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 14.
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mediating role of “the few,” a notion that for Plato, Aristotle, and Christian 
Neo-Platonists refers to virtuous elites who uphold principles and prac-
tices of reciprocity and mutuality (e.g., Politics II, 2, 1261a30–35).27
Second, linked to this configuration is the power of the central state 
and the free market. Both are constructed based on the myth of human 
artifice (such as the social contract) that brings about a peaceful natural 
order (beyond the violent state of nature).28 As such, state and market con-
verge and subsume the intermediary institutions of local and global civil 
society under the hegemony of the international system of nation-states. 
The logic of abstraction that governs both bureaucratic control and com-
mercial exchange does not just commodify labor and social relations but 
also subordinates the sanctity of life and land to the secular sacrality of the 
market-state.29
Third, the political “right” and the political “left” have defined them-
selves variously either in terms of the “one” and the “many” or in terms 
of the market and the state or in terms of the economic and the politi-
cal—or indeed all at once. All these poles are dialectically positioned and 
converge around a shared liberalism that fuses Machiavelli’s “new science 
of politics” with the eighteenth-century invention of political economy, as 
Michel Foucault has documented.30
Crucially, these three binary relations of the “one” versus the “many,” 
the market versus the state and the “right” versus the “left” are all ratio-
nal, spatial constructs that combine ontological nominalism with political 
voluntarism, as André de Muralt’s genealogical account shows.31 Taken 
together, these binary relations have redefined the nature and reality of 
civil society that in principle enjoys primacy over states and markets and 
27. Aristotle develops this line of argument in the direction of a constitutional system 
of “mixed government” that combines “monarchical,” “aristocratic,” and “democratic” 
elements, which blend hierarchy with equality (Politics IV, 1288b10–1301a15). Cf. Michel 
Foucault, “Omnes et singulatim: Towards a Criticism of Political Reason (1979),” in The 
Tanner Lectures on human Values, ed. S. M. McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1981), 2:225–54.
28. Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of 
Natural Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2011).
29. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944).
30. Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique: cours au Collège de france, 
1978–1979 (Paris: Seuil, 2004).
31. André de Muralt, L’unité de la philosophie politique: de Scot, Occam et Suarez 
au libéralisme contemporain (Paris: Vrin, 2002).
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embeds both abstract rights and formal contracts in real relations. Indeed, 
modern political ontology combines “the sovereign one” associated with 
the right and “the sovereign many” linked with the left that are variously 
more authoritarian-statist or more market-fundamentalist—or again both 
at once.
With this nominalist space, the primary real relations among persons—
who cooperate for both self-interest and the common, public good—are 
superseded by abstract, formal links consisting of either constitutional-
legal rights or economic-contractual ties. Those links favor activities for 
either commercial-market or state-administrative purposes and therefore 
are to the detriment of practices that are not purely instrumental but might 
pursue wider, social purposes. As a result, modern politics is little more 
than a social contract between the general will represented by the state 
(e.g., Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, and, more recently, Norberto Bobbio), on the 
one hand, and the personal will asserted through inalienable individual 
rights (e.g., Bodin, Locke, J. S. Mill, and, more recently, John Rawls), 
on the other hand. The logic of representation is the same nominalist-
voluntarist logic of transcendentalism and possibilism that underpins both 
modern absolutism and modern liberalism.
The extension of popular democracy and human rights since 1848 
has in some measure curtailed the arbitrary power of the “sovereign one” 
to the benefit of the “sovereign many.” However, democratization and 
individual rights have not just weakened the participation of the “few” 
but also subverted the ideal of representation. Democratic rule, especially 
in its secular liberal guise, views as legitimate only a vacuous generality 
such as abstract values that are drained of any substantive universal telos 
embodied in particular virtues. As such, democracy privileges the spec-
tacle of representing the general will over and above the concerns of the 
represented people. Tocqueville’s observation that freedom of expression 
is perfectly compatible with the tyranny of mass general opinion could 
hardly be more prescient in today’s “society of spectacle” (Guy Debord).
Liberalism has not only extended the three currents of possibilism, tran-
scendentalism, and absolutism but also fused them with the new doctrine 
of positivism. The liberal belief in boundless, linear progress was in large 
part founded on the scientific positivism of Comte and Spencer and shaped 
both Marxism and Fascism/Nazism.32 Indeed, the twentieth century saw 
32. Andrew Wernick, Auguste Comte and the Religion of humanity: The Post-theistic 
Program of french Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001); John Gray, Black 
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an apparent bifurcation between statisms on the far left or the far right, on 
the one hand, and economic-social ultra-liberalism, on the other hand. But 
both were grounded in the legal-positivist equation of “is” with “ought” 
that is nominalist-voluntarist. Moreover, both at the end of the nineteenth 
century and in the twilight of the twentieth century, the collusion of the 
strong state with the free market has produced “a hidden mutual complic-
ity and reinforcement between the voluntarism of the absolute state and 
the voluntarism of the self-governing, negatively choosing individual.”33 
Connected with this is the claim that only liberalism provides pluralism 
and diversity of choice—a “possibilist” utopia that Michael Oakeshott 
poignantly called “the blank sheet of infinite possibility.”34 Yet at the same 
time, the liberal settlement is really an imposed, even coercive, consensus 
to ensure that no choice other than liberalism can ever be effectively exer-
cised. As such, the notion of illiberal liberalism is increasingly warranted.
Much of postmodern thought seeks to overcome the transcendental 
foundationalism and liberal absolutism that characterize modern “political 
ontology.” However, the shift in emphasis away from modern dialectics 
toward postmodern difference (however spelled) merely repeats and even 
reinforces the pan-modern logic of dualism. By enshrining difference as 
the new “absolute,” much of postmodern philosophy and politics brackets 
the mediating relation between the unity of the “sovereign one” and the 
diversity of the “sovereign many.” As such, the postmodern reign of dif-
ference collapses into monism—whether a monism of the “one,” such as 
the Spinozism of Deleuze, or a monism of the “many,” like the rule of the 
multiple according to Hardt and Negri.35 The trouble is that postmodern 
monism so configured risks lapsing back into absolutism or else descend-
ing into nihilism. In either case, the securing of difference is of a piece with 
the celebration of neo-pagan agon that is variously more tragic or more 
heroic. Thus, postmodern difference is ultimately reducible to modern 
dialectics, and both are part of the logic of dualism that privileges nominal 
connections grounded in the will—the power of the one substance or the 
multiple multitude to “will” themselves into actuality.
Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the death of Utopia (London: Allen Lane, 2007).
33. John Milbank, “The Real Third Way,” in Adrian Pabst, ed., The Crisis of Global 
Capitalism (Eugene, OR: Wipf&Stock, 2011), pp. 27–70.
34. Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Lib-
erty Fund, 1991), p. 9.
35. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and democracy in the Age of 
Empire (London: Penguin, 2004).
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One alternative is to reach beyond monism in the direction of a non-
absolutist and non-nihilist universal that transcends the violent agon of 
difference. Badiou’s work, which is based on Cantor’s theory of “infinite 
infinites,” is a case in point. Badiou’s ontology consists in an infinite set of 
multiples that can be further deconstructed into infinite subsets, which are 
compatible with the pure event of universal singularity beyond the onto-
logic of representation.36 But linked to the self-instigating advent of pure 
event is for Badiou a Maoist advocacy of militant anti-capitalism outside 
of parliamentary politics and provisional revolutionary state terror, which 
is part of a naturalistic ideology that underpins both state collectivism and 
the uprising of the masses. What Badiou’s speculative naturalism has in 
common with the nominalist-voluntarist logic of modern ontology is to 
reject the analogy of being and bracket transcendence out of the picture. 
As a result, immanent beings lack real ties with one another, and there is 
nothing to mediate between the radical singularity of each being. Politics 
oscillates between a shared struggle against free-market homogeniza-
tion, on the one hand, and the uniformizing forces of statism, on the other 
hand—without a transcendent outlook that can bind together singulars and 
direct them to their common source. For this reason, Badiou’s apparent 
alternative fails to overcome the late medieval dualism of nature and the 
supernatural on which modern “political ontology” ultimately rests.
III. The Politics of Paradox
If, as I have argued, the modern redefines metaphysics as the onto-theolog-
ical sciences of transcendental ontology, then the postmodern marks not 
so much an alternative to this project as an aporetic extension of it. But 
there is an alternative modernity that builds on the metaphysical realism 
inaugurated by Plato and further developed by the Neo-Platonist Church 
Fathers and Doctors in both the Greek East and the Latin West. The triple 
current of participation, analogy, and universalism flows through the work 
of Meister Eckhart, Nicolas of Cusa, the Cambridge Platonists, the Nea-
politan and the Scottish Enlightenment to the post-secular metaphysics in 
the work of J. G. Hamann, Jacobi, and Schelling, who reach back beyond 
Kant and Hegel to renew the tradition of metaphysical realism.37 Common 
36. Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Continuum, 
2005).
37. John Milbank, “Knowledge: The Theological Critique of Philosophy in Hamann 
and Jacobi,” in Radical Orthodoxy, pp. 21–37; John R. Betz, After Enlightenment: The 
112  AdRIAN PABST
to these and other modern figures is a refusal to accept absolute finite lim-
its on the cognoscibility of the infinite—without however returning to the 
transcendentalism of Cartesian innate ideas in the mind and the dualistic 
separation of the knowing subject from the known object.
Knowing infinity is also a key theme of the contemporary revival of 
metaphysics associated with speculative materialism. Knowledge of the 
infinite is no longer confined to blind faith or pure reason but intelligible 
to both the senses and the mind because it is mediated in language and 
appearances. Linked to this move beyond the nineteenth-century secretly 
collusive opposition of rationalism and fideism (e.g., Kant) is an over-
coming of twentieth-century agnosticism that had sought to chart a third 
way between naturalism and speculation.38 Similarly, the renaissance of 
metaphysical and theological ethics shifts the focus from abstract, general 
being to the singularity of each person and the universality of truth beyond 
power or culture.39 Truth so configured is perennially invariant and at the 
same time reflected in ephemeral, material things. As such, truth is both 
universal and particular, which coincide in the singular.
Thus it is not so much the case that we are seeing a “return of meta-
physics,” as if the metaphysical had ever gone away. On the contrary, the 
renewed concern with questions of truth and universality beyond both 
empirical validity or logical coherence resonates strongly with Plato’s 
realist metaphysics. Here the notion of paradox is key. Philosophically, the 
logic of paradox concerns the realm of real relations and the transcendent 
good, which infuses all things with (a desire for) goodness in which each 
being can share.40 In a quest for true knowledge that exceeds mere opinion 
(doxa), Socrates opposes the sophists on the grounds that they reduce their 
speeches to commodities, which they either sell to the highest bidder in the 
marketplace of ideas (as Boris Groyse has remarked)41 or which they use 
Post-Secular Vision of J. G. hamann (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); John Laughland, 
Schelling versus hegel: from German Idealism to Christian Metaphysics (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2007).
38. Quentin Meillassoux, Après la finitude: essai sur la nécessité de la contingence 
(Paris: Seuil, 2006).
39. Robert Spaemann, Personen: Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen ‘etwas’ 
und ‘jemand’ (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1998); Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: La fondation de 
l’universalisme (Paris: P.U.F., 1998).
40. Plato, The Republic 510b, 511b, 517b–c, 519c–d, 526e; Theaetetus 206c–208b; 
The Sophist 259e, 263e–264a.
41. Boris Groys, The Communist Postscript, trans. Thomas Ford (London: Verso, 
2010), ch. 1.
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in order to manipulate others to their own ends. By contrast, to uncover 
the paradoxical nature of speech is for Socrates to disclose the reality of 
the transcendent true, good, and beautiful, which are present in all forms 
and all things. This presence is mediated to the human mind via both lan-
guage and ritual. The depth and mysteriousness of the universe warrants 
the use of myths, metaphors, and analogies. That is why Socrates eschews 
contradiction-free, coherent, and logically valid argument in favor of para-
dox that fuses logos with mythos.42
The language of myth and the practice of religious ritual provide 
human experience of the divine realm of the transcendent forms that direct 
the immanent realm of politics to the true, the good, and the beautiful. Cru-
cially, the finality of politics is neither about managing impersonal, natural 
necessities or a will to power that is variously more individual or more 
collective. Much rather, the teleology of the political is the harmonious 
ordering of the soul (psuche), the household (oikos), and the city (polis) 
according to the standards of kalon k’agathon, which fuses goodness with 
beauty and truth.43 Cicero makes the same argument about the intertwining 
of human culture and the natural world: “The bond of human community 
and association . . . is reason and speech, which . . . reconcile men to one 
another and join them in a kind of natural partnership [naturali quadam 
societate].”44 
In short, metaphysical realism suggests that there is no pre-political 
“state of nature” that requires a social contract (as for Locke, Hobbes, Rous-
seau, Kant, or Rawls). Man really is a social, political animal—embedded 
in associative bonds of family and community that are not the product of 
human artifice against the forces of unalterable nature but instead reflect 
the paradox of transcendent immanence and immanent transcendence.
Politically, the logic of paradox concerns the guidance of the soul, 
the household, and the city. The soul and the household require education 
and training by the good city in the same measure as the good city needs 
to be governed by honorable people and communities. This is connected 
with the idea of a virtuous guiding elite, the guardians of the republic, who 
guide the people just as they are guided by the reality of the forms that are 
beyond their control or manipulation. Indeed, for Plato the forms are not 
42. Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philoso-
phy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 3–46.
43. Plato, Gorgias 464b and 465a–e; The Republic 510b, 511b–c.
44. Cicero, De Officiis, book I, ch. XVI.
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Cartesian innate ideas in the human mind but embodied in really existing 
things and as such objects of reason, language, and ritual. Knowledge of 
the true, the good, and the beautiful is a matter of personal reflection and 
political engagement. It requires private contemplation, public discussion, 
and communal practice such as liturgy and sacrifice. The exercise of prac-
tical wisdom (phronesis) in pursuit of a just political order balances the 
democratic demand for the equal right of all with universal standards of 
the true and the good. As such, the perennial realism of Platonist meta-
physics rejects the empty universalism that underpins the liberal fusion 
of political absolutism with moral relativism under the guise of individual 
freedom of choice and the tyranny of mass opinion. 
Similarly, for Cicero the republic reflects a wider cosmic order in 
which reciprocal ties are mutually augmenting. The principle that under-
pins the creation of the public realm (res publica) is itself “a kind of natural 
coming-together (congregatio) of men”45—through bonds of friendship 
and other forms of human association that bind together the rights and 
shared interests of citizens within cities and commonwealths. Cicero links 
friendship to the “will of the people” and common consent, which provides 
mediation between those who govern and those who are governed. This 
account informs the ancient argument in favor of “mixed constitutions” 
that blend elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Balanc-
ing the power of the “sovereign one” and the “sovereign many” with the 
power of the “mediating few” (i.e., virtuous guiding elites) reinforces the 
rule of the personal. Crucially, the metaphysical politics and ethics of vir-
tue overcomes the abstract, vacuous generality of being, which is the mark 
of modern “political ontology,” in the direction of the human person that 
mirrors its divine source.
Economically and socially, the logic of paradox upholds real relations 
by accentuating social bonds of reciprocity and solidarity that are based 
on universal sympathy and are more mutualist in outlook, as Aristotle sug-
gested. By contrast with the modern disembedding of the economic from 
the social, Aristotle’s metaphysics models the economy (oikonomia) on the 
example of the household (oikos). In this manner, the economic is embed-
ded in the social and constitutes a “nested,” interlocking union of personal 
and professional associations. In ways that complement Plato’s guardians 
who uphold the Good, Aristotle emphasizes the goods that are internal to 
45. Cicero, de Republica, book I, ch. XXV.
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specific activities and accordingly accentuates the practice of virtue in our 
private as well as our public life. As the middle way between extremes, 
virtues mediate among competitive and potentially conflictual relations, 
directing them away from mutually diminishing vice toward standards 
of excellence and the common good. Just as courage is the middle way 
between recklessness and cowardice, so too justice marks a harmonious 
ordering of relations beyond selfishness and altruism. By linking citizens 
to one another in terms of mutual rights and reciprocal duties, justice is 
the “bond of men in states.”46 But since nature and human society are 
characterized by identity and difference (or commonality and unity) that 
threaten to cancel out each other, the polis requires a governing principle 
that can tie the universal to the particular: “[t]hat is why the principle of 
reciprocity, as I have already remarked in the Ethics, is the salvation of 
states. Even among freemen and equals this is a principle which must be 
maintained, for they cannot all rule together but must change at the end 
of a year or some other period of time or in some order of succession.”47
Thus, the logic of paradox views groups and associations as more 
primary than the individual and the collective. Across different societies 
and cultures, social bonds and intermediary institutions have traditionally 
been more fundamental than either constitutional-legal rights or eco-
nomic-contractual ties. The activities of autonomous and democratically 
self-governing groups and associations are for social purposes and reasons 
of mutual recognition that—paradoxically—can serve both private and 
public interests. They do so by helping to bring about conditions for the 
“good life” that all can pursue.
The focus on paradox in the ancient tradition of metaphysical real-
ism offers conceptual resources and appropriate practices to challenge the 
post-metaphysical direction of political ontology. It opens up the space 
for combining elements of “civil economy” with aspects of associative 
democracy in order to develop the idea of a “civil state” and a moral mar-
ket that can democratize both politics and the economy by re-embedding 
them in the social relations of civil society. Common to the traditions of 
“civil economy” and associative democracy are three closely connected 
arguments.48 First of all, the modern emphasis on the individual and the 
46. Aristotle, Politics I, 2, 1253a37–38.
47. Aristotle, Politics II, 2, 1261a30–35.
48. Polanyi, The Great Transformation; Paul Hirst and Veit-Michael Bader, eds., 
Associative democracy: The Real Third Way (London: Frank Cass, 2001); Luigino Bruni 
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collective neglects the importance of autonomous, democratically self-
governing groups and associations that mediate between the citizen, the 
state, and the market. Second, the active participation of groups and asso-
ciations is indispensable to a properly functioning democracy and market 
economy. Third, the social bonds and civic virtues that provide the glue for 
civil society are needed to make constitutional-legal rights and economic-
contractual ties work. The fundamental point is that the practice of virtue 
is not limited to predominantly non-instrumental relationships such as 
family, friends, or activity in the “voluntary sector” but extends to the 
largely instrumental relations in the polity and the economy.
The shared intellectual roots of this approach go back to nineteeth- 
and early twentieth-century critiques of liberalism and alternative theories 
of pluralism that draw on the tradition of realist metaphysics.49 Broadly 
speaking, liberalism combines some of the worst aspects of individual-
ism and collectivism. Laissez-faire capitalism reduces not only goods and 
labor but also land and social relations to commodities that can be freely 
exchanged according to their monetary market value. Bound up with this 
is the primacy of subjective, individual rights over mutual duties and 
reciprocal responsibilities within groups and associations. Since unbridled 
commercial exchange requires a force to eliminate resistance to it and 
compensate for any failures (or “negative externalities”), laissez-faire 
capitalism combines the “free” market with the strong state. For example, 
statist welfare that is run centrally and based on uniform standards and 
targets is subservient to capitalism because it compensates for market fail-
ure but does not change the fundamental relation between capital owners 
and wage laborers.50 As such, much of economic and political liberalism 
combines market atomism with state corporatism.
The pluralist alternative is, first of all, to reject both capitalist markets 
and collectivist states in favor of voluntary and democratically self-
governing associations that cut across the false liberal divide between the 
purely private sphere and the exclusively public sector by cooperating 
with state authorities and market actors in the delivery of services such 
and Stefano Zamagni, Civil Economy: Efficiency, Equity, Public Happiness (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 2007).
49. Among the key thinkers are Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Robert Owen, George Jacob 
Holyoake, John Neville Figgis, Harold J. Laski, and G. D. H. Cole. See Paul Hirst, ed., The 
Pluralist Theory of the State: Selected Writings of G.d.h. Cole, J. N. figgis and h. J. Laski 
(London: Routledge, 1989).
50. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, pp. 140–71.
 ThE POLITICS Of PARAdOx  117
as health, education, or welfare. As Paul Hirst puts it, this approach “aims 
to strengthen government in and through civil society; thus civil society 
takes on many of the attributes of the public sphere.”51 Second, political 
authority is more effective, efficient, and democratic if it is decentralized 
in line with the principle of subsidiarity, i.e., devolving power to the most 
appropriate level that promotes democratic participation and protects the 
dignity of citizens. By contrast with centralization and exclusive central 
state power, pluralism shifts the emphasis to the cooperation of different 
actors and a balance of power between interests within institutions. Third, 
the economy is not run according to the logic of “free-market” competi-
tion or bureaucratic state planning but instead along more mutualist lines, 
where firms are governed jointly by investors, managers, and workers, and 
financial investment includes a social purpose. Thus, the work of Polanyi 
can extend Hirst’s idea of “associative democracy” by democratizing the 
market and mutualizing the economy. Maurice Glasman puts this well:
The paradoxical idea here is that the greater the diversity of democratic 
institutions that entangle capitalism in relationships based on knowledge 
and mutuality, the better the chances of releasing the energies of the 
workforce and generating growth. The more workers have power, the 
more efficient it is; the more that local communities engage in bank-
ing, the more sustainable the returns. This is about breaking the logic of 
short-term returns, which undermines long-term development. I think 
that associative democracy has therefore to be complemented by a much 
more explicit notion of the possibilities and threats of capitalism, the 
logic of the market, and how to domesticate it.52
The idea of more mutuals or cooperatives instead of state-owned enterprise 
or private cartels/monopolies provides the link to Bruni’s and Zamagni’s 
“civil economy.”53 Indeed, this notion is based on the argument that the 
market can use resources efficiently and promote the common good 
effectively only if it is disciplined by the habit of practicing reciprocal 
51. Paul Hirst, from Statism to Pluralism: democracy, Civil Society and Global 
Politics (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 32.
52. Maurice Glasman, “How to Combine Hirst and Polanyi to Create a Strong Argu-
ment for an Embedded and Democratic Economy,” in Andrea Westall, ed., Revisiting 
Associative democracy (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2011), pp. 64–70; here, p. 69.
53. The origins of the notion of “civil economy” go back to Renaissance humanism 
and the Neapolitan Enlightenment. John Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scot-
land and Naples, 1680–1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 201–405.
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and mutual virtues. If, by contrast, the market is equated with pure instru-
mentality, then human and social relationships are reduced to means that 
maximize individual utility and private profit. Since the state enforces 
rights and contracts, it is an integral part of the liberal market logic. Here 
Bruni and Zamagni show that the principle of contract that underpins the 
modern market needs to be supplemented by the principle of reciprocity 
because otherwise self-interest overrides and ultimately undermines the 
common good—not the sum total of individuals goods and services but 
rather the good of real relationships and the worth of each and everyone 
in terms of their specific embeddedness in the complex webs of trust and 
reciprocity. Connected with this is the tendency of modern markets to 
“financialize the real economy,” a process that also cuts off production 
and trade from the common good that enhances rather than diminishes real 
utility and happiness. Thus, the politics of paradox emphasizes the need to 
re-embed both the state and the market within a wider network of social 
relations that are governed by reciprocal virtues such as justice, solidarity, 
fraternity, and responsibility. Such a politics is more economically egali-
tarian than the social-democratic left and more committed to a culture of 
virtue than the neo-liberal right.
Conclusion
This essay has argued that modern “political ontology” needs to be over-
come in the direction of a metaphysical politics. Philosophically, modernity 
and postmodernity are characterized by the invention and extension of the 
onto-theological science of transcendental ontology. The work of Scotus, 
Ockham, Machiavelli, and Suárez bequeathed three currents—possibil-
ism, transcendentalism, and absolutism—that flow through figures such as 
Wolff and Clauberg to Kant, who consummates the complete critical turn 
of modern ontology into epistemology, with the dualism of the knowing 
subject and the known object constitutively unresolved.
Politically, all the modern binary opposites such as state versus market 
or left versus right are grounded in a modern logic of dualism—the aporia 
between unalterable nature (the originally violent “state of nature”) and 
human artifice (the social contract). This logic of dualism reduces real rela-
tions among people or between humanity and the natural world to nominal 
connections that take the form of constitutional-legal rights or economic-
contractual ties. Such nominal connections undermine the social bonds of 
reciprocity and mutuality and the intermediary institutions of civil society 
upon which vibrant democracies and market economies depend.
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By contrast, the alternative logic of paradox eschews the dualistic 
categories such as the “left” linked to the central state versus the “right” 
allied with the free market in favor of a “radical center.” This “radical 
center” is the metaphysical realm of real relations and the common good in 
which all can share. Metaphysics properly configured translates into social 
bonds of reciprocal trust and mutual giving underpinning diverse forms of 
human association. Such bonds are—paradoxically—more particular than 
commercial ties based on abstract standards of monetary value and also 
more universal than the supposedly inalienable individual rights to life or 
to property that can be alienated by the state or the market. 
By combining a focus on civic and ethical limits to both central state 
and free market power with an emphasis on greater economic equality 
and political participation, the logic of paradox is more progressive than 
left-wing centralized statism and more conservative than right-wing, 
“free-market” liberalism. As such, it outflanks the “old left” and the “new 
right” in the direction of a paradoxical politics. The notion of paradox is 
neither a logical contradiction nor a residually transcendental dialectic but 
instead that which exceeds opinion in the direction of true knowledge and 
wisdom—an immanent openness and outlook to the transcendent truth 
and beauty of the supernatural good in God.
